Between 1922 and 1941, Soviet policy
toward Germany alternated between cooperation and hostility. At first
glance, the evidence suggests that the Soviets were indecisive about
their relations with the Germans. However, this paper argues that a
deliberate political calculus guided Soviet decision-making, namely the
desire to avoid entanglement in another major war. The key to achieving
this aim, in their estimation, was the restoration of a European balance
of power* [*Balance of power is defined as the attempt to secure peace
by creating alliances with the capacity to offset each other in the
event of an attack]. Thus, the Soviets maintained an alliance with
Germany inasmuch as it served their overriding policy objectives. When
Hitler's rise to power raised the specter of German revanchism, the
Soviets correspondingly moved toward a new collective security**[For the
purposes of this work, collective security refers to the formation of
inter-state alliances in order to deter outsider attacks.] arrangement
with the Entente powers. As collective security began to break down and
signs of an impending European war intensified, the Soviets tried to
resurrect the German alliance. In the end, however, the Soviet policy
lens obscured their ability to discern the real danger Hitler posed and
led them into the exact situation they had so diligently tried to avoid:
an isolated war against Nazi Germany.
By 1922, the avoidance of war had already gained a preeminent place in Soviet foreign policy decision-making. Lenin vividly recalled how during the civil war the Western powers actively sought to destroy the nascent Soviet regime, dispensing troops and material assistance to support the White movement. Consequently, the threat of capitalist encirclement took on a greater urgency for Lenin and his cadre after the war. Fear of isolation made security concerns paramount in the Soviet foreign policy calculus.
At the same time, security was given newfound emphasis in order to
afford the Soviet regime room to focus on domestic concerns. Burdened
with the enormous task of consolidating power and rebuilding the
nation's economic and military base, the Soviet regime needed to shore
up its resources. The realization that further entanglement in foreign
conflicts would jeopardize the regime's survival spearheaded a new
politics of accommodation. In conjunction with this new policy shift,
ideological principles had to be reformulated. According to R. Craig
Nation, the call for worldwide revolution was shelved "in order to
prepare for what Lenin called 'peaceful coexistence with the capitalist
world"' (38). In sum, this new accomodationist approach was an attempt
to achieve a higher degree of security so that the country could augment
its economic and military strength.
Looking at the post-WWI order, Lenin
feared the emergence of an anti-Soviet coalition among the European
powers, a fear that intensified after the USSR was excluded from the
League of Nations. Germany presented the means to restore a balance of
power within Europe, and the two countries' mutual exclusion from the
Versailles system served as a unifying basis for cooperation. In April
of 1922, the Soviet quest for security generated a significant payoff in
the form of the Rapallo treaty. In addition to opening up political
ties, the Rapallo agreement included a secret clause providing for
German military and technical assistance in exchange for training in
Russia. This component furthered the post-war recovery of each, namely
Soviet industrialization and German military development. In this way,
the Rapallo link served both the international and domestic interests of
the Soviet regime.
Rapallo remained virtually
untarnished until Hitler's rise to power in 1933. Despite the Nazi's
anti-communist rhetoric and revanchist policies, Soviet retaliation was
minimal. In fact, according to Vojtech Mastny, Stalin initially welcomed
fascism, believing that it signaled capitalism's impending end. After
several arrests of Soviet citizens in Germany and violent attacks on
Soviet business premises, however, the Soviets became increasingly
unnerved. Nevertheless, they continued their efforts to preserve the
Rapallo line, publishing a call for revision of the Versailles system in
Pravda in May 1933. According to Jonathan Haslam, this letter signaled
"all hope had not been lost of reviving Rapallo, but that the initiative
was now up to the Germans" (15). Despite such attempts, German-Soviet
cooperation suffered further deterioration.
Increasingly, the Soviets considered
Nazi Germany a threat to peace in Europe and the continuation of
Stalin's industrialization campaign. Hitler's decision to sign the Four
Powers Pact with Italy, France, and Great Britain in July of 1933 was an
incontrovertible sign of Rapallo's demise. Germany's uncertain
allegiance unraveled the status quo balance of power and confronted the
Soviets with the prospect of isolation. In response, the Soviets sought
new strategies to salvage the balance of power. The goal of preventing
war if at all possible remained the preeminent Soviet foreign policy
concern.
The new imperative to offset German
revanchism paved the way for Litvinov's collective security proposal. By
1934, new efforts were underway to tie the USSR and the Entente powers
in opposition to Nazi Germany. Although Litvinov's effort to bolster
cooperation with the Entente was a logical reaction to heightened German
aggression, the road to collective security was filled with obstacles.
The persistent Soviet distrust toward the bourgeois, Western democracies
weakened cooperation efforts and made it all the more difficult to move
away from the pro-German orientation established by Lenin. For
instance, French pressure to join the League of Nations initially
sparked intense Soviet resistance, prompting some Soviet leaders to
advocate a return to Rapallo. However, new appeasement attempts were
abandoned when Hitler tried to overthrow the Austrian government on July
25, 1934. Nevertheless this gesture showed that even as Soviet leaders
lauded coalition building as the principal foundation for security, they
were clearly not against using the European powers against one another
in order to further Soviet aims.
The freedom to maneuver was an
essential tool in Soviet foreign policy making and indeed, Moscow's
double-dealings did not go unmatched. During the summer of 1935, the
British stepped up their efforts to redirect Hitler eastward, urging
France to support them. By July, the French foreign minister was
pursuing an understanding with Berlin and seeking to delay ratification
of the Franco-Soviet pact. As the French became more closely tied to
Britain, the Soviets felt betrayed. According to Haslam, they were left
"with an alliance which was essentially inoperable without British
goodwill, and since the British did not trust the Russians, Soviet
isolationists did not have to look far to find support for their views"
(101). In response, Soviet officials in Berlin communicated their
willingness to reduce interstate tensions, although hopes were soon
dashed by Hitler's increasingly anti-Soviet line. These retaliation
measures did little to shift the Entente powers' foreign policy in a
more pro-Soviet direction. In fact, they intensified the feelings of
mistrust and made cooperation less and less tenable.
By 1938, Litvinov's collective
security system faced a critical test. German invasion of Czechoslovakia
appeared imminent. Under the terms of the 1935 mutual assistance pact,
the USSR was compelled to defend Czechoslovakia as long as the Czech
people and France both rose up in defense. As the Soviets awaited a
corridor of access to provide military protection to the Czechs, France
and Britain arranged an exclusive meeting in Munich. Here they agreed to
the German annexation of the Czech Sudetenland. From the Soviet
perspective, this outcome signaled the utter failure of collective
security.
France and Britain's decision to make
conciliatory gestures toward Germany assumed that the Soviet Union was
firmly locked in the Entente camp. Given Hitler's anti-communist
rhetoric, they saw little potential for a Soviet-German alliance. They
failed to realize, however, that the Soviets never completely abandoned
the Rapallo option. The true gravity of this misjudgment became clear in
the wake of the Czechoslovakian crisis. Beginning in December 1938, the
USSR concluded a new trade agreement with Germany, an indication of
growing rapprochement. Although negotiations with Britain and France
continued throughout the summer of 1939, intensified Soviet demands were
countered with deliberate delay on the part of the Entente, heightening
tensions between the two sides. In May, Litvinov was replaced as
commissar of foreign affairs by Molotov, a move that effectively spelled
the end of collective security.
With Hitler showing himself more open
to expanding relations with the USSR, the lion's share of Soviet
diplomacy focused on resurrecting Rapallo. Initially, attempts to forge
Soviet-German rapprochement were hindered by the Baltic question.
Indeed, the German seizure of Memel from Lithuania alarmed Stalin
because of its close proximity to Leningrad. However, by 1939, Hitler
showed signs that he intended to strike Poland next rather than the
Baltics. Given their historical animosity toward Poland, the Soviets
were much more amenable to this policy. Thus, with the Baltic issue off
the table, the Soviet Union could more easily afford to pursue a modus
vivendi with the Germans.
Stalin identified rapprochement with
Germany as the most effective way to avoid war. By August 1939, the two
countries signed a nonaggression treaty with a secret protocol for the
division of Eastern Europe. One month later, they finalized the zones of
influence and broadened the nonaggression treaty into an alliance.
Whether or not Stalin believed that the agreement would actually last
remains open to debate. At face value, it offered the Soviets a chance
to avoid military entanglement while simultaneously heightening tensions
between Germany and its western neighbors and was, thus, consistent
with Stalin's overriding foreign policy objectives. Indeed, the alliance
proved partially successful inasmuch as it delayed Soviet entrance into
the war by one and a half years. To a country still recovering from the
effects of Stalin's purges, that window of time was believed to be
vital.
The German-Soviet alliance was not
without its risks for the Soviet Union. As Nation noted, economic
provisions in the pact augmented German power, an outcome that clearly
ran counter to Soviet interests. In November 1939, the USSR was cut off
from the League of Nations. Under these conditions, the USSR would be
left to its own defenses in the event of a German invasion. This
scenario was extremely alarming to Stalin because he knew just how
weakened the Soviet military was as a result of the purges. Thus, the
desperate need to avoid war was sufficiently compelling to push the
Soviet Union toward the dangerous commitment with Germany.
Reservations about German intentions
increased following Hitler's surprisingly quick defeat of France. Only
Britain and the USSR remained as obstacles to continental German
domination. Stalin reacted with a heightened campaign to rebuild the
military high command, but this enormous task required time. Cognizant
of his limited maneuvering room, Stalin stepped up efforts to appease
the Germans. Whether it meant turning a blind eye to Germany's
annexation of Bulgaria or increasing military exports, Stalin held out
hope that Germany would honor the nonaggression treaty. In Hitler's
estimation, however, the pact had outlived its usefulness. Thus, while
the Soviets clung desperately to the appeasement line, Hitler was
formulating plans for Operation Barbarossa. With the launch of Hitler's
blitzkrieg attack in June 1941, the Soviet Union was drawn into
full-scale war.
In conclusion, the USSR's policies
during the interwar period reflected an overwhelming desire to avoid war
and relations with Germany were measured accordingly. In 1922, the
Soviets pursued an alliance with the Germans as a means to restore a
balance of power in Europe and to prevent the formation of a united
anti-Soviet front. Indeed, the Rapallo line served Soviet security
interests well until Hitler's rise to power. In spite of dogged attempts
to preserve the treaty, the Soviets eventually recognized the gravity
of Hitler's threats and began to seek other security arrangements. This
outcome paved the way for Litvinov's collective security approach.
During his tenure as foreign minister, the USSR sought a partnership
with the Entente powers in opposition to a revanchist Germany.
Nevertheless, in order to maximize their tactical flexibility, the
Soviets kept lines with Germany open, never entirely abandoning the
Rapallo link.
By 1938, major divisions threatened
to undermine collective security. Soviet exclusion from the Munich
agreement and the West's continued dilatoriness added weight to the
perception that Soviet security was in jeopardy. Indeed, Stalin was
increasingly convinced that continued alignment with the West would lead
the USSR into war. Concomitantly, German negotiators had begun sending
signals to the USSR regarding the possibility of rapprochement.
The combination of these events set the stage for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Under this agreement, the USSR's aversion toward war forced it into a dangerous posture of appeasement vis-a-vis Germany and effectively blinded them to Hitler's real intentions. After Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets found themselves completely isolated and woefully unprepared to fight the German army. Thus, in the end, the Soviet security obsession backfired. Neither accommodation nor confrontation had successfully neutralized Germany.
Works Cited:
- Haslam, Jonathan. 1984. The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, 1933-39. New York: St. Martin's.- Mastny, Vojtech. 1996. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Nation, R. Craig. 1992. Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.